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ABSTRACT 
Access control of NUTS uplink 
The goal of this thesis is to investigate the cryptographic parameters in access control of NTNU 
Test Satellite (NUTS), and to make recommendations for secure uplink of NUTS. NUTS is a 
nano-satellite popularly known as CubeSat which is being developed by NTNU. The ease and 
low cost in construction cost shows that there is growing demand for developing and launching 
CubeSat. This thesis analyzed the communication protocol, security protocol, protection 
against replay and integrity of uplink commands for NUTS. 
 
The brief introduction of NUTS and requirement of security parameters were presented along 
with the scope of thesis. The analysis of the security protocols used by similar CubeSat projects 
was done, nonetheless very few had implemented a security protocols. The security issues in 
wireless communication systems were discussed with the advantages and disadvantages of 
different security protocols. Also, NUTS hardware and software platform was discussed to 
insight the NUTS architecture.  
 
The integrity protection was focused than the confidentiality of message in uplink. Therefore, 
this thesis analyzed the threats in protocol adopted for communication between internal 
modules of satellite as well as between space and ground station. In addition, the possible ways 
of mitigation were explained. Here, three different hash functions were tested in AVR platform 
to check the computation efficiency in microcontroller. The efficient hash was proposed to use 
in HMAC for integrity protection. The different key exchange mechanisms were also discussed 
to address the key distribution and resynchronization between satellite and ground segment. 
 
Finally, some modifications were recommended in existing protocol that makes the system 
secure against the integrity and replay. The results also show that the addition of sequence 
number to check the freshness of message, HMAC code and CRC is feasible to transmit within 
AX.25 frame. Last but not the least, further modification to this research and possible future 
extension were proposed. 
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 CHAPTER 1          
INTRODUCTION 
This master thesis is carried out on the base of project report done by master student Vilius 
Visockas on date 2011-2012 [17]. Since, both the works are based on the same platform; it also 
possesses similar concepts of uplink security. However, this report is concentrated in the 
authentication and integrity in NTNU Test Satellite (NUTS) uplink rather than encryption. 
 
Absence of security parameters in a payload results unauthorized user 
(hacker/attacker/malicious user) to retransmit the command or tamper the payload. They can 
intentionally make CubeSat to execute a false command and control upon the resources or even 
destroy the CubeSat. This may leads to denial of service from satellite or even loss of the 
satellite permanently. Therefore, it is necessary to protect our system to get access from such 
attacker. There are several cryptographic approaches to protect against the attacker. Here, we 
preferred to protect integrity of source and data rather than encryption. Encryption only protects 
the confidentiality of message but fails to protect integrity. Meaning that, it has no confidence 
from where the message is coming and the originality of data. In this scenario, it is very 
important to protect the integrity of message. In NUTS, we decided to use HMAC based 
integrity protection. NUTS use CubeSat Space Protocol (CSP) to communicate between the 
internal module as well as space and ground segment. This CSP includes SHA-1(secure hash 
algorithm-1) for integrity protection but we also checked the feasibility of other two different 
hash functions. In addition, we solved our major concern of replay attack with the 
implementation of sequence number (SN) in every CSP packet. We also analyzed the 
feasibility of SN and HMAC code in CSP and radio packets. The analyses of different key 
exchange mechanisms are also presented which we found infeasible to use trusted third party. 
Finally, the design of uplink transmitter from the ground segment and receiver of satellite 
segment were also presented. All these work were done within the limitation of CubeSat 
constraints and making system as simple as possible which was the great challenge. 
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This thesis has five chapters in which first chapter introduces NUTS briefly and the scope of 
this thesis. The objective and methodology are explained in this chapter which also includes the 
introduction of similar successful projects.  The hardware and software platform used in NUTS 
project are explained in chapter two. Later part of this chapter points out the need of security in 
satellite communication systems.  
 
The detail security analysis of cryptographic algorithms used in uplink is analyzed in chapter 
three. It also includes the analysis and necessity of secure hash function and key exchange 
mechanism. In chapter four, the best possible mechanisms and techniques are listed and 
explained which mitigates the security threats. The design of uplink and the downlink is also 
proposed in this chapter. Finally, chapter five consists of conclusion and the possible extensions 
of this work in future. 
 
1.1 Scope of thesis 
In every communication systems, the information should be protected in both the ways (i.e. 
uplink and downlink). However, in case of NUTS, the uplink data is only protected whereas 
downlink data is not encrypted at all.  It contains educational data like weather information, 
pictures and videos of space which can be accessed by tuning a correct frequency. Thus, it is 
not vulnerable to access the downlink data from any other stations. Nevertheless, the uplink 
command must be sent by legitimate user. The task of employing a successful access control 
solution lies in determining the appropriate authentication and authorization mechanisms. On 
Board Computer (OBC) in CubeSat should verify the command or data received is being 
transmitted from the legitimate ground station.  In this thesis, an uplink security of CubeSat is 
analyzed and the changes in CubeSat Space Protocol (CSP) are proposed. For secure uplink, 
the encryption algorithm is untouched whereas authentication and integrity is explained in 
detail. 
This thesis work is carried out within the following objectives; 
 To analyze the current CSP protocol and recommend the best approach for NUTS 
access control and uplink security. 
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 To substitute the hash function SHA-1 with either Blue Midnight Wish (BMW) or 
Edon-R in CSP for better security and efficiency in execution. 
 To find a solution to the replay protection by using some counter mechanism  
 To address the problem of resynchronization. 
Current CSP protocol uses SHA-1 in HMAC and XTEA as encryption algorithm. Still, they 
cannot guarantee against the replay. The idea behind the substitution of message digest function 
SHA-1 by BMW or Edon-R is to use a different hash function which is efficient in terms of 
speed and size of code with higher security. To avoid more power consumption in satellite 
which is power limited, an efficient but highly secure hash function is proposed. The detail 
explanation is presented in chapter three about the choices of hash function. Hash function 
protects the integrity of the message which is also explained in chapter two. Resynchronization 
is an important issue in long distance wireless propagation. Attenuation and degradation of 
signals by interference make the signal unreachable in the destination. Similarly, delay in the 
propagation should be considered that breaks the synchronization in communication between 
source and destination. These effects are considered in the later chapter and the best approach 
for security and synchronization are proposed for NUTS. 
 
1.2 Methodology 
To test the computational speed and the size of hash function, we compiled all the three hash 
functions in Atmel AVR Studio 5.1 and Microsoft Visual Studio 11. We used visual studio to 
cross check the output of HMAC with AVR studio.  After successful compilation of the code in 
Atmel AVR Studio 5.1 which was written in C, a hex code is generated. We then checked the 
size of generated hex file of each hash algorithm to determine the size content by it.  This is the 
size of program code that resides in the memory of microcontroller. The reason we are focused 
towards the memory of microcontroller is due to limitation in its internal memory. 
AT32UC3A3256 which has 256 Kbytes is only memory which is responsible for processing 
and storing its software [11]. Hence, it is very important to consider the size of code during the 
choice of hash function. However, NUTS is working to expand external memory up to 16 MB 
which will eliminate the memory limitation problem. The computational speed is determined 
  
14 
 
simply by calculating the clock pulse difference before and after the executing source code. In 
other words, hashing the messages of different size and taking the average clock pulse required 
to digest the message. Moreover, Atmel AVR Studio 5.1 is also used to benchmark the 
execution speed. 
 
Finally, different mechanisms were analyzed against the replay protection and key exchange 
mechanism. The most efficient key exchange mechanism, integrity protection and replay 
protection approach for the NUTS CubeSat was discussed and proposed. 
 
1.3 Similar Projects  
It is found that the CubeSats launched up to this date has not been focused intensely in its 
security. Most of the CubeSats uses AX.25 protocol and cyclic redundancy check (CRC) for 
radio packet transmission and error detection respectively. AX.25 is a link layer protocol which 
is used to transmit radio packets among the sender and receiver. Data is encapsulated in a frame 
and transmitted as a packet [26], the maximum packet size transmitted is 256 bytes. It provides 
very low level of security through bits in control field with checking the frame order, sequence 
and the arrival timing. Furthermore, CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check) is used as an error 
detecting code in communication systems. The algorithm which is based on cyclic codes will 
generate a sequence of bits. These bits are appended with the original data during the 
transmission. Similarly, at the receiving end the CRC is recalculated and compared with the 
received one. It keeps the integrity of the message up to some level. However, it is not 
sufficient to protect against an intentional attacker. It is possible for an attacker to alter the 
message, recalculate the CRC value and retransmit towards the destination. 
 
SwissCube 
It is a Swiss CubeSat designed to conduct research into nightglow within Earth’s atmosphere 
[28]. It uses AX.25 protocol to frame format in uplink and downlink as well. It used CRC with 
polynomial x
16
 + x
12
 + x
5
 + 1 to check the error in payload [28]. 
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Figure 1: SwissCube AX.25 frame format, taken from [28] 
In figure 8, frame sequence check value of 16 bit is assigned for CRC. But it has not 
implemented any additional security measures against integrity protection and replay. 
 
AUSAT II 
This CubeSat is built and operated by students from Alborg University in Denmark. It uses 
modified AX.25 protocol and AAUSAT-II protocol which was developed by them [30]. 
AAUSAT –II protocol contains the features of acknowledgement from satellite to earth station 
after the reception of data frames. Reception of NACK enables earth segment to resend data 
frame [31]. There is no security mechanism implemented besides error checking with ACK and 
NACK in AUSAT-II. 
 
AubieSat-1 
AubieSat-1 is the first student built CubeSat in Auburn University with volume and weight of 
1000 cm3 and 1.03-kg respectively. This CubeSat studies radio wave propagation through the 
ionosphere test solar panel protective films [32]. Besides Morse code, it does not have any 
cryptographic approaches implemented to protect against the attacker or malicious user [33]. 
 
1.4 Summary 
The outcome of this research work is expected to decide the implementation of security 
features in uplink of NUTS. Security parameters used in CubeSat Space Protocols are analyzed 
and some new changes are proposed. It considers the sequence number to protect against replay 
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and HMAC code to protect integrity. It was found that resynchronization of sequence number 
was an issue in long distance wireless propagation and this could be address by implementation 
of time stamp. Therefore, time stamping can be a better solution than sequence number. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
THEORY BEHIND CUBESAT AND SECURITY 
2.1 Introduction to CubeSat: 
CubeSat is a miniaturized satellite launched into a low-earth orbit (LEO) and used for 
education and scientific purpose. The idea of launching small satellite named CubeSat was first 
presented by California Polytechnic State University (CalPoly) and the Space Systems 
Development Laboratory (SSDL) at Stanford University. They targeted University students to 
provide knowledge about space science exploration [2]. CubeSats are constructed within many 
constraints which are shown in figure 2 [1]. 
 
 
Figure 2: CubeSat Goals 
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After the successful launch of their CubeSat, several other Universities are following this trail 
by developing and deploying this sort of nano-satellite for space exploration and educational 
purposes.  
 
The motivations behind popularity of CubeSat are as follows [3]; 
 
 The advancement of technology has greatly decreased the electronic chip size 
resulting in the production of complex and very small integrated circuits (ICs). 
 Enormously increasing in the processing capability and reduce the power 
consumption. 
 Student from the different faculties are involved in making CubeSat. 
 It is cost friendly. 
 Lower earth orbit allows higher data rates with less error because of short 
communication distance.  
 
2.2 NUTS background 
NTNU Test Satellite (NUTS) is the part of the Norwegian Student Satellite program which is 
hold by Norwegian Centre for Space-related Education [NAROM]. The goal of this project is 
to design, manufacture and launch a double CubeSat by 2014 [4]. It project is being carried out 
by students from various departments like; IET (Department of Electronics and 
Telecommunication), ITK (Department of Engineering Cybernetics), IPM (Department of 
Engineering Design and Materials), PHYS(Department of Physics), IDI (Department of 
Computer and Information Science) and ITEM (Department of Telematics). The project is run 
and managed by IET but students from different departments have their own Professor from 
respective department as a supervisor. The satellite lab and ground station room are located in 
the fifth floor which serves common place for all project members to work together, study, 
weekly progress meeting etc. Each student is working on their own respective area. These areas 
are categorized as communication, internal data bus OBC and power management, ACDs, 
payload, mechanics and system. Including NUTS, CUBEstar at university of Oslo and 
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HINCube at Narvik University College are two other CubeSat projects run by NAROM. 
However, NUTS have its own model including size (10*10*20) cm, communication bus, 
security protocols etc. 
 
2.3 Implementation Platform  
2.3.1 Microcontroller AVR32UC3 
AVR32UC3 is a 32-bit RISC microprocessor architecture designed by Atmel. It was designed 
by Øyvind Strøm and Erik Renno in Atmel's Norwegian design center. In this microcontroller, 
most instructions are executed in single-cycle. It is the most efficient microcontroller with high 
performance and low power consumption [5]. 
Some of the key features of AVR UC3 are listed below [6]; 
 Software Library — All UC3 devices are supported by AVR Software Framework, a 
complete library of device drivers and middleware. 
 Connectivity — USB device and host, Ethernet MAC, SDRAM, NAND flash, and 
fast serial interfaces are ideal for complex applications. 
 Arithmetic performance — Integrated FPU increases precision and dynamic range in 
digital signal processing. 
 High data throughput — Peripheral DMA, multi-layered databus and large on-chip 
SRAM remove bottlenecks in high-speed communication. 
 Low power consumption — picoPower® technology delivers the industry's lowest 
power consumption in active and sleep modes. 
 
In NUTS project, we are using AT32UC3A3256 microcontroller which has inbuilt software 
library. Out of all, encryption library is the one function that supports cryptographic functions 
for adding security to any application [6]. The library contains AES, 3DES, MD2, MD4, MD5, 
SHA1, SHA256, RSA1024, X.509 TLS version 1 and SSL version 3. These cryptographic 
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functions can be used for secure communication between parties. These are also integrated with 
other libraries like TCP/IP and USB communication stack. 
2.3.2 FreeRTOS 
FreeRTOS is a very small portable, robust and open source operating system. Therefore, it is 
suitable for small applications on small platforms. Due to this feature many processors and 
microcontrollers implement FreeRTOS. Some features of FreeRTOS that make it a most 
popular operating system as explained in [7]are listed below. 
 Very small memory footprint, low overhead, and very fast execution. 
 Scheduler can be configured for both preemptive and cooperative operation. 
 Co-routine support (Co-routine in FreeRTOS is a very simple and lightweight task 
that has very limited use of stack) 
 Trace support through generic trace macros. Tools such as FreeRTOS+ trace 
(provided by the FreeRTOS partner Percepio) can thereby record and visualize the 
runtime behavior of FreeRTOS-based systems. It includes task scheduling and kernel 
calls for semaphore and queue operations. 
The OBC in NUTS project uses FreeRTOS because CSP we using is ported to FreeRTOS. 
2.3.3 AVR Studio 5.1 
This toolkit is the Integrated Development Environment (IDE) for developing and debugging 
embedded Atmel AVR applications. It is simple to use and supports all 8-bit and 32-bit AVR 
microcontrollers. The AVR Studio® 5.1 editor simplifies code editing and let us to write code 
more efficiently. This IDE connects easily to Atmel AVR debuggers and development kits for 
C/C++ and assembler code [10]. 
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2.4 Ground Segment equipment 
In order to communicate with space segment, various software and hardware equipment are 
required in ground segments. Those are mentioned as follows; 
 Computer with Window XP operating system. 
 Antenna Yagi-Uda for UHF and VHF. 
 WXTrack and decoders for satellite tracking. 
 
2.5 Security Issue 
Here, some security related issues during communication between ground station and satellite 
station are discussed. Similarly, simple principle of some cryptographic mechanism like 
encryption, MAC and HMAC are also mentioned. However, this thesis is focused solely in 
integrity. 
 
Risk with unsecure satellite communication 
There are, of course, risks to unsecured satellite based communication. Specifically, if one got 
access to a satellite systems then that may damage the satellite or even disastrous consequences 
may ensue. What might happen, for example, if sensitive military information is disclosed? 
What if the upcoming information of natural disaster is prevented to transmit? What if high 
level diplomatic communication is intercepted and replied? All these may lead to the unwanted 
consequences. The likelihood of attack is low in educational satellite like CubeSat which is also 
mentioned in project report by Vilius [17]. However, author in [25] describes gaming, profit or 
revenge and ego as the source of the common motivations for an attack are popular in wireless 
networks. According to [25], a hacker who enjoys his free time in tracking and attacking 
other’s system is gaming attack. Attackers are also motivated with profit or revenge, such that 
collapsing and corrupting of other’s system may lead to the profit or tangible reward to an 
attacker. 
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Need of encryption 
The area covered by the satellite beam on the earth surface is called footprint. The signal 
transmitted by the satellite disperses in conical fashion as it approaches the surface of the earth. 
Thus, signal may be made available over a wider geographic area than would be optimally 
desirable. In the absence of encryption, anyone tuning the radio in that region can receive the 
message. Confidentiality protects against the malicious disclosure of information but in 
CubeSat only the uplink data are encrypted. The uplinked payload is encrypted in CubeSat so 
that attacker without key cannot read the data easily. Generally, simple encryption algorithm is 
preferred in CubeSat due to its design. The downlink data is kept unencrypted so that anyone 
can tune the correct frequency and extract the information. This is because; it contains only 
educational information about space behavior which does not need much that of security like 
that of Defense System. 
 
Symmetric Encryption 
Also known as private key encryption in which same key is used for both encrypting and 
decrypting of message. For instance, if party A wants to communicate with party B via satellite 
using symmetric encryption method, then both A and B must agree on a unique secret key. As 
long as the key remains secret, it serves to authenticate both parties. Advance Encryption 
Standard (AES), RC4, Data Encryption Standard (DES) and Triple DES or 3DES are the 
commonly used symmetric encryption algorithms. 
 
Figure 3: Symmetric encryption where Alice encrypts with secret key 
K and Bob decrypts with the same shared secret key K 
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From Figure 3, Alice uses her secret key to encrypt the message and transmits to Bob. Bob, as a 
receiver decodes or decrypts the message sent by Alice with the same key shared with her. 
Consider the case, if Alice also wants to communicate with third person Carla, then both of 
them must agree on their own unique secret key. In this way, a symmetric encryption system 
needs different and unique keys among all participants. Otherwise, Bob could masquerade as 
Alice or Carla. Nevertheless, symmetric encryption is very simple to implement. 
 
Problem with Symmetric Encryption: 
A symmetric encryption needs to establish a unique secret key in advance among all other 
communicating parties. This approach to satellite communication is annoying since, it should 
have either pre-shared key or key exchange mechanism. The tradeoff exists in both mentioned 
mechanisms. Pre-shared key mechanism will be destructive if the key is compromised and the 
key exchange mechanism adds the complexity in the CubeSat system. 
 
Asymmetric Encryption 
In an asymmetric encryption, the keys used for encryption and decryption are different. For 
instance, if Alice wants to setup Bob a secure communication, Alice first asks Bob for his 
public key, which can be transmitted over an unsecured connection. Alice then encodes a secret 
message using Bob’s public key. This message is secure because only Bob’s private key can 
decode the message. To authenticate herself to Bob, she needs only to re-encode the entire 
message using her own private key before transmitting the message to Bob. On receiving the 
message, Bob can establish if it was sent by Alice, because only Alice’s private key could have 
encoded a message that can be decoded with Alice’s public key. In this way it can protect 
authentication of source to some extent. 
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Figure 4:  Asymmetric encryption and decryption, taken from [8] 
 
Figure 5: Authentication in asymmetric encryption algorithm, taken 
from [8] 
Problem with Asymmetric Encryption 
Alice must request Bob’s public key over an unsecured channel. If this request is intercepted by 
third person Darth, he can supply Alice with his own (i.e., Darth’s) public key. Alice will then 
encrypt the message with Darth’s public key, after which she will re-encrypt the result of the 
first encryption operation with her own private key. Alice will then transmit the encrypted 
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message to Bob, which will again be intercepted by Darth. Using Alice’s public key in 
conjunction with his own private key, Darth will be able to decrypt and read the message.  
The figure below summarizes the entire process of replay process in four steps: 
1. Darth intercept message sent by Alice to Bob which contains the request of Bob’s 
public key for secure communication setup. 
2. Darth reply with his own public key. 
3. Alice will re-encrypt the message with Darth’s public key and her own private key 
and send to Darth, assuming Bob is the receiver. 
4. Darth can decrypt and read the message. 
 
Figure 6: An example of man in the middle attack in which Darth 
intercepts the communication between Alice and Bob 
In above figure, it is possible for Darth to masquerade the communication between Alice and 
Bob. Consider a scenario where Darth after viewing or modifying the message from Alice, re-
encrypt with Bob’s public key and transmit to Bob.  In this case, Bob has no idea about the 
originality of message. This type of tampering and resend of message is called replay attack. In 
CubeSat, this type of attack could be dangerous since anyone who gets accessed can send the 
forge command to CubeSat. Also, asymmetric encryption is slower than symmetric encryption. 
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It requires far more processing power to both encrypt and decrypt the content of the message 
which is not feasible approach in CubeSat [17]. 
 
When deciding on which encryption method to use, designer must consider the value of the 
data being transmitted, the purpose of the transmission, and the technological and 
computational limitations of the target satellite. CubeSat is not commercial satellite, it is purely 
lunched for educational purpose, and thus the risk of attack is low. However, anybody can harm 
the satellite if the security is compromised. 
 
Need of Integrity and Authentication 
Another major problem associated with satellite encryption is related to the identity and 
authenticity of the sender. A satellite needs to confirm that the control signals and commands it 
is receiving from the ground are originated from a legitimate source, this is source integrity. 
Otherwise, attacker may tamper with bad commands and disrupts the functioning of satellite. 
Encryption provides only confidentiality not the integrity of the message [29]. A mechanism 
should be used to protect data integrity. Encryption cannot protect against the replay attack, it 
only make information opaque such that attacker cannot read the content. Therefore, 
authentication is needed to avoid spoofing and unauthorized access. Integrity of data should be 
checked for the telecomands. Thus, in telemetry integrity is highly considered than encryption. 
 
Hash Function, MAC and HMAC 
Hash function is an algorithm that maps the message of arbitrary length to a smaller set of fixed 
length. The value returned by a hash function is called hashes or hash value.  A Hash value is a 
checksum that calculated upon a file on piece of data to produce a unique value. Hash value can 
be used to verify that a file has not been altered after the hash was generated. Collision resistant 
and one way are the two important properties of function that should be satisfied to be a good 
hash function [8]. These properties explain that the two different inputs to hash function do not 
produce a same output. This implies the fact that every input has unique hash output. These 
properties of hash function allow using the hash values as digital signatures. 
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Message Authentication Code (MAC) 
Encryption provides the confidentiality of the message but cannot ensure that a message 
coming from the alleged source has not been tampered. Authentic encryption can be achieved 
by combining encryption algorithm with authentication algorithm [29]  Message authentication 
protects the integrity of a message, validates identity of originator, & non-repudiation of origin 
[8]. MAC is similar to encryption but may not be reversible.  
MAC = CK(M) 
Where, 
M – Input message 
C – MAC function  
K – Shared secret key 
MAC – Message authentication code 
 
Figure 7: Message authentication process, taken from [8] 
Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) 
A MAC mechanism which is based on cryptographic hash functions is called HMAC. HMAC 
can be used in combination with any cryptographic hash functions like MD5, SHA-1, SHA-2, 
Whirlpool, Tiger, HAVAL etc.  It takes underlying hash function as a black box. Figure 8, 
shows a generation of HMAC using any of these hash function. 
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Figure 8: HMAC generation, taken from [8] 
HMACK (M) = Hash [(K+ XOR opad) || Hash [(K+ XOR ipad) || M)] ] 
Where, 
K+ is the key padded out to size 
opad, ipad are outer and inner specified padding constants respectively. 
 
The key length for HMAC can be of any size; longer keys are first hashed and used whereas 
shorter keys are strongly discouraged as it would decrease the security strength of the function 
[9]. HMAC is considered very secure but its security depends on underlying hash algorithm. 
The output of HMAC has the same size as that of the underlying hash function, although it can 
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be truncated which is not recommended [9]. Truncation results in fewer bits to transmit over 
communication link and reduce an authentication algorithm overhead, but it has less security 
strength than original sequence. Thus, except brute force attack and birthday attack, it is very 
difficult to destroy HMAC. 
 
CubeSat Space Protocol (CSP) uses Secure Hash Algorithm-1 (SHA-1) as iterative algorithm 
for HMAC. However, SHA1 is vulnerable to collision resistance (discussed in chapter three) 
and also slower than other hash functions. In this thesis, we are intending to replace SHA1 with 
other message digest function which is secure and efficient too. 
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 CHAPTER 3 
UPLINK THREAT ANALYSIS 
3.1 CubeSat Space Protocol (CSP) 
CubeSat Space Protocol (CSP) is a network-layer delivery protocol designed by the students at 
Aalborg University for CubeSats. The protocol has 32-bit header which contains both network 
and transport layer information. Its implementation is designed for embedded systems such as 
the 8-32-bit AVR microprocessor from Atmel but not limited to these microcontrollers. The 
source code is written in C language and can run on FreeRTOS, POSIX and Linux operating 
systems. CSP version 1.1 supports Mac OS X and Microsoft Windows too. 
 
Implementation of this protocol is actively maintained by the students at Aalborg University 
and the spin-off company GomSpace. The source code and other necessary documentations are 
found under LGPL license and it is hosted by GitHub [12]. CSP corresponds to the same layers 
as the TCP/IP model. The implementation supports a connection oriented transport protocol 
(Layer 4), a router-core, and several network-interfaces. 
Features of CSP [13]: 
 Simple API similar to Berkeley sockets. 
 Router core with static routes. Supports transparent forwarding of packets over e.g. 
spacelink. 
 Support for both connectionless operation (similar to UDP), and connection oriented 
operation (based on RUDP). 
 Service handler that implements ICMP-like requests such as ping and buffer status. 
 Support for loopback traffic. This can for instance, be used for Inter-process 
communication between subsystem tasks. 
 Optional support for broadcast traffic if supported by the physical interface. 
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 Optional support for promiscuous mode if supported by the physical interface. 
 Optional support for encrypted packets with XTEA in CTR mode. 
 Optional support for HMAC authenticated packets with truncated SHA-1 HMAC. 
There are two versions of the CSP header. The latest version (1+) was released on November 
2010, which supports more hosts and ports. It can be noted that length field is not mentioned in 
header. 
 
Version 1+ 
In the new version, the header was redefined to support more hosts and ports. CSP now 
supports up to 32 hosts on the network, with 64 ports available on each host. The port range is 
still divided into three adjustable segments. Ports 0 to 7 are used for general services such as 
ping and buffer status, and are implemented by the CSP service handler. The ports from 8 to 47 
are used for subsystem specific services. All remaining ports, from 48 to 63, are ephemeral 
ports used for outgoing connections. The bits from 28 to 31 are used as flag for HMAC, XTEA 
encryption, RDP header and CRC32 checksum. 
 
 
Figure 9: CSP version 1+ header 
 
CSP Header 
32 bits 
Payload 
(0-65535) bytes 
 
Figure 10:  CSP Frame 
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3.2 eXtended Tiny Encryption Algorithm (XTEA) 
XTEA is the extension of Tiny Encryption Algorithm which was designed by David Wheeler 
and Roger Needham. Since, some weakness was found in TEA which is referred in [14], 
XTEA was developed as improved version of TEA. XTEA is 64 bit block cipher with feistel 
structure and key size of 128 bits. The payload in CSP is encrypted using XTEA during the 
uplink. 
 
3.3 Integrity of message 
In the mini-satellite like CubeSat, prime importance is given to the protection of source 
integrity and data integrity. Source integrity provides the assurance that the data received is as 
sent by an authorized entity. It gives the confidence to the receiver end that the communication 
is bind with the legitimate entity. Data integrity gives the assurance that the data received has 
not been modified in the way. Therefore, integrity protection keeps the originality and 
authenticity of message. There are several cryptographic techniques used for integrity 
protection like IPsec, CRC, MAC, HMAC etc. However, HMAC is our interest due to its 
security strength and feasibility. 
 
3.4 Choice of hash function 
3.4.1 Attacks on SHA1 
Secure Hash Algorithm SHA1 is a cryptographic hash function with the output digest size of 
160 bits. These generated output is unique thus, HMAC is used in digital signatures, MAC, 
password table, hash tables etc. In [20], authors proposed a collision in SHA1 in 2
69
 hash 
operations. This attack is about 2,000 times faster than brute force attack which finds the 
collision in 2
80
 rounds. In simple words, probability of occurring same hash output of two 
different messages is in 2
69
 calculations. In contrast, this practically needs quite large time and 
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energy to obtain this hash value. Therefore, it is not realizable in practical scenario. However, 
this is not secure enough for future applications since the semiconductor performance doubles 
in every 18 months (Moore’ law) and computer performance per dollar doubles every 21 
months (Robert’s law) [21]. Furthermore, paper [27] presents an interesting concept of rainbow 
table which stores all the computed hash. These pre-computed values are used to find the match 
of hash function and immensely reduce the burden to re-compute hash. Therefore, this method 
is very efficient for an attacker and saves a huge amount of time. 
 
The hash of data is a prime component in message signing and validating process. In this 
scenario, if any two different messages hashed to a same digest value, then it is possible to 
execute unwanted command by a CubeSat. This should be considered or guaranteed in 
designing a secure CubeSat transmission. Interestingly, we have different alternatives for SHA-
1 like SHA-2, whirlpool, RIPEMD etc. However, with the recommendation of more secure and 
efficient hash function like Blue Midnight Wish (BMW-256) or HAIFA-EDON-R256 (Edon-
R256); we are intended to replace SHA1. 
3.4.2 Alternative digests function: 
BMW and Edon-R 
BMW [22]and Edon-R [23] are the cryptographic hash functions. These hash functions were 
submitted as a candidate for SHA-3 hash competition organized by National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST). BMW and Edon-R are a cryptographic hash function with 
output size of 224, 256, 384 or 512 bits. In this thesis, BMW-256 and Edon-R256 are being 
discussed for NUTS project. Both the hash functions are resistant against length extension 
attacks and resistant against multi collision attacks [22]and [23]. Though some attacks have 
been carried out in BMW and Edon in [24], it is not feasible in current technology. Another 
reason for selecting these hash functions was computational efficiency. These hash functions 
are designed to be much more efficient than SHA-1 and SHA-2, with higher level of security. 
Faster the algorithm, efficient it is from power economic point of view. Power consumption is 
one constraint that should be considered in CubeSat. In NUTS, photo voltaic cell provides the 
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energy whereas external batteries are used for backup. It could be interesting to design a system 
with power efficient in satellite segment. 
3.4.3 Efficiency and code size comparison 
In this section, the results of all three hash functions are presented. All these hash functions 
were used to generate HMAC with key 20 byte and 64 byte key and input message of different 
size. They clock frequency used was 16 MHz for AVR UC3 [11]. The clock cycle was 
initialize to zero before the start of HMAC and marked after HMAC is generated. Here, input 
message was taken less than 1024 bytes to observe because CubeSat has small data bytes to 
hash. Also, 20 bytes and 64 bytes of key size were originally provided with the source code and 
we believe they are strong enough against birthday paradox. Therefore, common inputs for all 
the hash functions were fed. The average value of output clock cycles were obtained in the 
table and cycles per byte were calculated. The outputs for 128 and 256 bytes are highlighted 
since AX.25 frame format can send maximum packet size of 256 bytes. Therefore, input and 
output of 128 and 256 bytes message for all three hash functions are marked. 
 
This source code was compiled with AVR studio 5.0 in Window 7, 32-bit operating system. 
The processor of Intel core2 duo with 2.27 and 2.26 GHz with the ram of 4 GB was used. 
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Table 1: Computational speed of Edon-R256 for different input and key 
size 
Edon-R256 
Size of input 
message 
Average cycles 
(for 20 byte key) 
Cycles/byte Average cycles 
(for 64 byte key) 
Cycles/byte 
8 8920 1115 9362 
 
1170.25 
 
16 8876 554.75 
 
9318 583.375 
32 8803 275.09 9246 288.93 
64 10515 164.29 10958 171.21 
128 12071 94.30 12512 97.75 
256 15179 59.29 15620 61.02 
512 21395 41.78 21836 42.64 
1024 33827 33.03 34268 33.46 
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Table 2: Computational speed of BMW-256 for different input and key 
size 
BMW-256 
Size of input 
message 
Average cycles 
 (for 20 byte 
key) 
Cycles/byte Average cycles 
 (for 64 byte 
key) 
Cycles/byte 
8 14158 
 
1769.75 
 
14600 
 
1825 
 
16 14114 822.13 14556 909.75 
32 14041 438.78 14484 452.65 
64 16155 252.42 16598 259.34 
128 18081 141.25 18522 144.70 
256 21929 85.66 22370 87.38 
512 29625 57.86 30066 58.72 
1024 45017 43.96 45458 44.37 
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Table 3: Computational speed of SHA-1 for different input and key size 
SHA-1 
Size of input 
message 
Average  cycles 
(for 20 byte key) 
Cycles/byte Average cycles ( 
for 64 byte key) 
Cycles/byte 
8 14563 1820.37 14951 1868.87 
16 14256 891 14760 922.5 
32 14322 447.56 14538 454.31 
64 16387 256.04 17605 275.07 
128 18670 145.85 19833 154.94 
256 22062 86.178 23770 92.85 
512 30921 60.39 31206 60.94 
1024 45634 44.55 45896 44.82 
 
 
Form the information obtained from three tables, two graphs are drawn below which 
demonstrates the computational efficiency of all three hash functions to generate HMAC using 
20 byte and 64 byte key. The horizontal axis represents the size of message hashed and the 
vertical axis shows the time required to hash relative to cycles per byte. 
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Figure 11: Performance of Three hash functions in HMAC using 20 
byte key 
 
Figure 12: Performance of Three hash functions in HMAC using 64 
byte key 
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In figure 11 and 12, bar with green color represent the computational speed of Edon-R, blue 
represents BMW and red represents SHA-1 against the different message size. From figure, 
Edon-R 256 and BMW-256 are faster than SHA-1 for all the input bytes. It also shows that 
Edon-R256 is much faster than BMW256 and SHA-1 in all formats. An important conclusion 
can be drawn from the graph is that with the increase of input message size, the efficiency of 
hash function increases. Another remarkable conclusion is the size of key, larger is the key size 
slower is the computation of HMAC. Similar tests are being carried by VAMPIRE in different 
platforms and results obtained are analogous to our result. VAMPIRE develop a toolkit called 
SUPERCOP (System for Unified Performance Evaluation Related to Cryptographic Operations 
and Primitives) to measure the performance of cryptographic software [38]. This toolkit 
benchmark the time to hash the different sized data. In [34] and [35], the different hash 
functions are compared and presented in tabular form and graph. Their output for different 
processors and frequency are congruent to the result incurred from our analysis. 
 
After compiling the source code, hex file is obtained for respective hash functions. These hex 
files can be used to determine the size of source code. For these functions, Edon-R256 has the 
smallest size of 40 KB, followed by SHA-1 which has 74 KB and finally BMW which has 92 
KB. Since, these hash functions were not designed for AVR platform; they still can be 
optimized for AVR platform in term of execution efficiency and code size.   
 
3.5 Cyclic redundancy check for error detection 
A 32-bit checksum is used in CSP to detect an error in transmission. A sequence is obtained as 
the remainder of polynomial division of their contents; these values are similar at both the 
transmitting and receiving end for error free transmission.  It is simple to implement and good 
algorithm in detecting error caused by noise. It keeps the message of original transmitted 
message therefore keeps an integrity of message. However, CRC is not suitable for protection 
against the intentional professional hacker. Most of the launched CubeSat used CRC due to its 
simplicity and less overhead in transmission. 
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3.6 Secure Key Exchange Mechanisms   
We have already discussed the cause of replay attack in earlier chapter. Replay and tampering 
is possible if an attacker has an access to a key. Strong encryption algorithm or strong hash 
algorithm does not remain secure if their key is compromised. Thus, secure key exchange 
mechanism is foremost for secure communication. In NUTS, same key has to be shared 
between ground segment and satellite segment. This section analyzed the possible efficient 
mechanism to share the key between two parties. Here are some commonly adopted approaches 
for secure key exchange between two parties. 
3.6.1 Symmetric Key Distribution  
Some common forms of symmetric key distribution are describes in this section. This approach 
uses same key between two communicating parties and most of them uses Trusted Third Party 
to assist key. 
 
Wide-Mouth Frog 
This is symmetric key management protocol and involves Trusted Third Party (TTP) to 
distribute a new shared key. It also protect against the replay of old messages by providing the 
timestamp. Two parties wishing to establish a secret session has to share a unique key with 
TTP. However, this protocol suffers from following problems: 
 A is not assured that B exists 
 Insecurity while distributing initial key between TTP and other party 
 Initiator must be able enough to generate strong keys 
 Synchronization of clock is needed to generate timestamp 
 
Kerberos 
It provides mutual authentication between clients and servers in distributed environment and 
also protects against replay and eavesdropping [8]. It uses two TTPs, a ticket granting server 
and authentication server. After authentication of client, ticket granting server issues a ticket 
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and session key to client. Interaction between clients and server is protected with key and ticket 
which has fixed life time. This protocol provides mutual authentication between client and 
server, timestamps to protect against replay. There are still some problems associated which are 
as follows; 
 Since it uses timestamps, thus synchronization is needed. 
 It needs the continuous availability of central server. 
 Authentication server and ticket granting server can be a target for DOS attack. 
 
Otway Rees 
This is also authentication protocol which uses TTP for shared session key. Mutual 
authentication is done between party A and B and also uses index number to protect against 
replay. All these interacting messages are encrypted thus gives more security. Some problems 
related to this method are follows; 
 Secure generation and distribution of key between communicating parties and TTP is needed. 
 During authentication process may leads malicious intruder to access shared key. 
 
Needham-Schroeder  
This protocol is primarily an authentication protocol in first phase. After authentication is 
completed, a shared symmetric key is established between the parties. This protect against 
replay by the use of random numbers that provides the freshness of message. This protocol uses 
symmetric cryptography which makes it faster. Some limitations of Needham-Schroeder are 
listed below [8]; 
 Replay attack is possible if old session key is used. 
 TTP is a single point of failure. 
 TTP must be trusted by both the parties. 
  
Blom’s Scheme 
 
This is based on symmetric key pre-distribution scheme and does not need third party. The 
security of Blom’s scheme depends on the chosen value of “t” which is called Blom’s secure 
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parameter. Larger the value of “t” higher the resilience but increase the amount of memory 
required to store the key. 
 Tradeoff lies between key size and memory requirement. 
 In order to prevent share key computation by attacker, all the sets of parameters selected by 
user should be linearly independent. 
 
Decentralized scheme 
In this scheme, only two parties are involved in secure key exchange. These are based in 
challenge response based. Therefore, one party acts as initiator and another act as responder. 
This scheme is simple to implement and does not need third party for key distribution. 
However, it is not free from limitations which are listed below. 
 Risk of attack is high. 
 Attacker can intercept and masquerade. 
3.6.2 Merits and demerits of Symmetric Key Distribution 
Several symmetric key exchange and key distribution schemes have been explained in previous 
section. The advantages and disadvantages have been found for all schemes, some common of 
them are listed below.  
 
Advantages of Symmetric Key Distribution 
 It is easy to manage entities in network and easy to change entity’s keys except for 
Kerberos. 
 Only one permanent key is stored. 
 Symmetric-key ciphers are faster. 
 
Demerits of Symmetric Key Distribution 
Most of the key exchanges mentioned make use of a Trusted Third Party, where every entity 
shares a pre-established initial key with the TTP. Therefore, in every communications require 
initial contact with TTP. Here are the lists of issues associated with TTP [39]: 
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 “Trusted Distributor” problem: the secure communicating channel and the trusted 
distributor are needed and TTP is the single point of failure.  
 TTP must store keys for all the communicating parties of parties.  
 Secret keys may be compromise during transmission 
 TTP can read all messages therefore trust is required by all entities.  
 Since TTP is center for all communication parties, it shows performance bottleneck. 
 Lots of communication through TTP makes it target for attack.  
3.6.3 Asymmetric Key Distribution 
Asymmetric or public key cryptosystem require two separate keys known as public key and 
private key for each user. Public key is known to all where are private key is secret to user. 
Public key is used to encrypt the message and corresponding private key will be able to decrypt 
that message. Unlike, symmetric key algorithm, an asymmetric algorithm does not need to 
establish initial session to exchange secret keys between communicating parties. 
Some schemes of public key distribution are discussed below. 
 
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 
This method allows two unknown parties to jointly establish a shared secret key over an 
insecure public network. Here session key is only created when it is needed, so it is not 
necessary to store it. This decreases the risk of exposure of key. There are some problems listed 
in this approach which is listed below. 
 Likelihood of man in the middle attack, since communicating parties is not 
authenticated. 
 Its strength depends on the choice of prime numbers. 
 
 
ElGamal Key Agreement 
This algorithm is based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange. It consists of encryption algorithm, 
decryption algorithm and key generator component. The security of ElGamal depends on 
underlying cyclic group and padding scheme used on the message. The message can be 
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encrypted to many possible cipher texts which add confusion to the attacker. Some problems 
associated with this algorithm are mentioned below. 
 ElGamal key exchange is slow. 
 Increase the overhead since the size of cipher text is twice than that of original 
message. 
 No authentication of entity. 
 
Shamir’s Three-Pass Protocol 
This protocol allows one party to securely send a message to a second party without the need to 
exchange or distribute encryption keys. The sender and the receiver exchange three encrypted 
messages in three phases. Problem associated with this public key distribution protocol is man 
in the middle attack since there is no authentication of entities. 
 
Digital Signature Algorithm 
The DSA signature scheme has advantages, being both smaller and faster, over RSA [8]. DSA 
cannot be used for encryption or key like RSA. Nevertheless, it is a public-key technique. The 
DSA is based on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms, and is based on schemes 
originally presented by ElGamal and Schnorr. But, this algorithm is slower than symmetric 
approach. 
3.6.4 Merits and demerits of Asymmetric Key Distribution 
Some of the common advantages and disadvantages of public key distribution are listed. 
Merits of Public Key Crypto for Key Exchange 
 Asymmetric key cryptography offers additional features which are not easily 
obtainable with symmetric cryptography 
          -Online TTP is not required 
         -Source integrity and authentication 
 The number of keys necessary in large network may be considerably smaller than in 
the symmetric-key environment. 
 Only the private key should be kept secret. 
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Demerits of Public Key Crypto for Key Exchange 
 Public key distribution methods are slow compared to symmetric cryptography.   
 Key sizes are typically much larger than those required for symmetric-key encryption.  
 An encrypted message can only be sent to a single recipient.  
3.6.5 Why Symmetric key and Why not Public key? 
Public key encryption/decryption algorithm is a fundamental and widely used technology 
around the globe. But it is complex, slower and consumes more power. Therefore, it is not 
common among ultra-low power environments like wireless sensors and CubeSat [19]. 
Therefore, Symmetric key encryption algorithm with low-energy consumption is used in low 
power environments. Furthermore, public key encryption is slower than symmetric encryption 
of same security level. It needs more computation time for the computation of public and 
private keys. From this scenario, symmetric key is considered as simple, fast and low power 
consuming methodology.  Moreover, the important scenario of CubeSat should be accounted 
while designing or selecting the key exchange protocol. The propagation delay between earth 
segment and space segment makes the protocol with several authentication steps and multiple 
round trips are not feasible to use in CubeSat. Since, probability of interference due to noise is 
higher in long distance wireless transmission, Signal to Noise Interference (SNI) decreases 
resulting in error in transmission. Multiple round trip authentication mechanism has to setup 
handshake before establishing communication between two parties. Therefore, multiple round 
trips have high probability of getting error which results in authentication failure. Similar 
problem may appear for synchronization which results in denial of service. 
 
3.7 Countermeasures against replay  
It is clear that we are not encrypting the uplink payload. Our intension is to protect the integrity 
and replay messages so that tampered and replayed payload is rejected at the satellite segment. 
We mentioned HMAC to protect integrity of message but it fails to protect against replay. For 
instance, an attacker with an idea of reboot command of CubeSat can retransmit again and 
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again which makes the satellite continuously restarting resulting into DoS. This section 
discusses some techniques used in communication to prevent form replay. One time passwords, 
session tokens are mostly used in web based client server authentication model. One Time 
Password (OTP) is used to authenticate only once and renewed for next authentication. 
Similarly, session tokens are the data that carries the information for that communication 
session. These two concepts protect replay attack since they relies in non-reuse of key. So, in 
future an attacker cannot use the previous password or session token to establish a 
communication. Besides these techniques, uses of time stamp and sequence number are other 
techniques widely used in communication systems against replay attack. 
 
3.8 GENSO 
Global Education Network for Satellite Operations (GENSO) is  a software standard developed 
with the goal to release a global network of  university ground stations and radio amateur to 
support the operation of CubeSat. The interconnection between ground stations is done via the 
internet and software allows to share and free access to other station. Therefore, it allows 
commanding their CubeSat from other part of world [40].  
 
The visibility of CubeSat is about 20 minutes in a day, in rest of the time ground station is in 
ideal state. In this scenario, an idea of GENSO is very innovative towards the utilization of 
station from any part of the world and also, to get access similar data from other CubeSat. 
GENSO has three components Ground Station Server (GSS), Authentication Server (AUS) and 
Mission Control Client (MCC). Ground station operator run GSS and MCC is run by mission 
controller. GSS after receiving the data notifies AUS. AUS is center core for authentication and 
control access control among the permitted bounded entities. Now, AUS after receiving 
notification from GSS pass the notification to MCC owning the satellite. MCC then retrieves 
all the locally stored data from GSS. 
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NUTS is also planning to use GENSO but till this date the software has not been released. It is 
very important to study its access control and authentication measure before adopting the new 
software. Nevertheless, this software seems very efficient in term of utilization of CubeSat. 
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 CHAPTER 4 
PROPOSED CSP FOR SECURE UPLINK IN NUTS 
This chapter finds the best approach for the NUTS access control and uplink security within 
underlying constraints. The modified CSP is presented along with its merits and demerits. We 
are not using any encryption mechanism on uplink payload which will only add complexity in 
CubeSat system. 
 
4.1 Key size and hash function 
We propose symmetric key distribution, 20 byte key hardcoded in both ground segment and 
satellite segment. The key length of 20 bytes has good resistance to birthday attack and strong 
enough for brute force attack. The calculation shows that 20 bytes (160 bits) hash has 
approximately 1.46*10
48
 different outputs. If these are all equally probable then it will take 
around 1.5*10
24 
attempts to generate collision using brute force. It was also observed that 20 
bytes key was faster than key length of 64 bytes to generate HMAC. 
 
 Single key is used for HMAC, though we discussed about the different key exchange 
mechanism, it is not suitable to use either TTP or any protocol using multiple RTT. 
Propagation delay and loss of signal makes the authentication process complex and also 
generates the resynchronization problem. It is difficult to resynchronize the key in robust 
wireless environment and may leads to denial of service. So, HMAC code protects the system 
against integrity but adds an overhead in communication system and complexity of calculating 
as well as comparing the code in satellite segment. 
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4.2 Countermeasures against replay 
Sequence number in other hand solves the problem of replay attack. Sequence number is the 
random sequence that adds the freshness in every message and keeps the information about 
following message. Attacker cannot replay with old sequence number which is already 
registered in the receiver’s entry. Also, if an attacker tries to insert the new sequence then he 
could not modify the HMAC content. HMAC is very strong cryptographic function which 
produces fixed byte output depending upon the key used. The data is initialized; sequence 
number is added and encapsulated with CSP header to form CSP packet. HMAC is calculated 
upon this complete CSP packet and concatenated with CSP packet.  CRC is calculated upon 
entire packet (from CSP header to HMAC code) and appended with this packet to form 
payload. This final block is ready to send using AX.25 protocol. This complete procedure is 
shown in the figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 13: Proposed NUTS Secure Uplink 
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This complete frame at transmission section shown in Figure 13 is encapsulated in AX.25 radio 
link protocol and transmitted towards receiver’s end in form of radio packets. In the receiving 
end, the packets are received and processed. Figure 14 shows the complete steps of information 
extraction process in proposed secure NUTS receiver. 
 
In order to eliminate confusion regarding the term used for packets, we assume them as 
follows; 
CSP information field: Data 
Complete CSP packet: CSP header+ SN+ Data 
CSP payload: CSP header+ SN+ Data+ HMAC code+ CRC code 
Complete AX.25 packet: AX.25 frame/ radio packet 
AX.25 information field: Information field (CSP payload) 
 
Figure 14 shows the proposed secure transmitter for NUTS. It is assumed that the radio packets 
are received and buffered in initial condition, and then the operation of system is explained as 
follows; get the radio packets from the buffer which is AX.25 radio frames. This radio packet 
constitutes of head, information field and tail bits. Information field encapsulates CSP payload 
which is extracted in the next step. AX.25 tail bits contain 16 bit frame check sequence to 
determine the error on frame during transmission. Upon detection of error, the frame is 
discarded and computes for the new frame. The next security check computes for CRC-32, 
compare with the received CRC code and makes a decision. Similarly, HMAC of complete 
CSP packet is calculated and compared with the received HMAC code. An unaltered sequence 
will have same code and is proceed further but the packets are discarded if different values are 
detected. Upon successful verification of HMAC, sequence number is checked against replay. 
The packet is discarded again if sequence number is already registered in receiver’s entry. If the 
fresh sequence number is found then packet is further processed and sequence number is 
updated. The commands are extracted and sent to other subsystem and the system again starts 
extraction with new radio packet. Also, after rejecting packets, system will start with extraction 
of fresh packet. 
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Figure 14: Proposed NUTS secure receiver 
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The replayed sequence is identified in almost last stage which is the primary disadvantage of 
this design. Therefore, if an attacker releases numerous replayed packets then all these packets 
are able to execute up to almost final stage. This will only engage the processor and results 
worthless with loss of energy and resources. But this issue can be resolved prioritizing the SN 
checking mechanism which can be placed between A and B in Figure 14 . By prioritizing the 
SN check results another priority issue for HMAC. Here again same problem appear for 
HMAC which is checked at the last stage therefore altered packed are executed up to last stage. 
The use of CRC prevents packets from being alter but cannot prevent professional hacker to 
alter the original message. Therefore, this tradeoff should be considered during the design. 
 
4.3 Modification in CSP header 
 
Figure 15: Modified CSP header, SN flag used in 27th bit  
Figure 15, shows the modified proposed CSP header on version1.0+. In this modified header, 
SN flag is incorporated as 27th bit; this bit was reserved for future purpose. The enable of this 
flag indicated the presence of sequence number in the packet. In NUTS, every CSP packet will 
be consisting of sequence number. New fresh sequence number will be assigned in each new 
CSP packet. 
 
 
 
  
54 
 
4.4 Length of Sequence field 
We have proposed to use the sequence number of 16 bit long. It gives 65536 unique counts 
which is enough to send the unique number with each CSP packet till life time of NUTS. It is 
assumed that the life time of NUTS ranges from 2 month to maximum of 2 years. From the 
simulation by NUTS member, earth segment can communicate 28 times in a week with satellite 
station. Also, multiple commands are uploaded at a time, in this scenario; 16-bit sequence is 
quite realistic to provide unique identity for each CSP frame.  
 
4.5 Sequence number synchronization 
It is necessary to synchronize a sequence number after the reboot of system in satellite. Also, 
consider the worst case when all the transmitted commands from ground station are lost on the 
way to satellite. Then, transmitting a set of new commands next time will have new sequence 
number while satellite segment has previous old SN.  This type of unusual leaped sequence 
may be rejected by the system, resulting in denial of service. Therefore, a command is 
necessary to synchronize the SN and keep it updated. Therefore, to avoid the rejection of all 
packets due to mismatch problem in SN a special command request “SYN_NEW_SN” is sent 
that does not has sequence number. This command makes the OBC of satellite components to 
fetch the latest sequence number used and send as response towards ground station. Similarly, 
this concept is also useful in reboot command. We can set a reboot command without SN such 
that synchronization would not be necessary, this makes the reboot efficient since no 
computation for SN is required and no synchronization is checked. 
 
Request format 
The request and response command forma are drafted by NUTS members. To synchronize the 
sequence number we have proposed two commands which are discussed below. 
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Table 4: Request command format from NUTS draft 
16 48 
Command type Command argument 
Table 5: Proposed Request command description 
 
 
 
Response format 
On successful reception and handling of a request, the success bit will be set high in the 
response data and send the latest updated sequence number to the ground station. With the idea 
of latest SN, ground station can then transmit CSP packet with new sequence. 
 
Table 6: Response format from NUTS draft 
1 7 1 7 24 2^24 
Success bit 
 
Command type 
 
Last response Options Length Payload 
 
Table 7: Proposed response description  
Response type Description Parameter Parameters 
Request type Description Parameter 
SYN_NEW_SN Synchronize with 
received sequence 
number 
16 bit fresh sequence 
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RES_GEN_ERROR General error N/A  
RES_SYN_NEW_SN Response to synchronize SN command Fetch latest 
updated SN 
 
Table 7 shows two commands as a response to request command. RES_GEN_ERROR is a 
response to general error which is already proposed and drafted in NUTS whereas we propose 
another error response RES_SYN_NEW_SN to distinct from general error. This error indicates 
that the satellite cannot fetch the latest SN from the entry. In this situation we have no 
alternative to reboot the system and request for latest SN. All the drafted commands for NUTS 
are given in an appendix A. 
 
These special commands needs the SN check mechanism at the receiver to distinguish from the 
normal commands.  This mechanism is shown in flowchart of Figure 16. It assumes that the 
radio packets are received and extracted. Therefore, it only focuses in the validation of SN flag 
that determines the types of commands. 
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Check the SN flag
If SN flag=1
Check command 
type
Check the SN
If command 
=reboot or Sync
Discard packet Execute command
YesNo
No Yes
B
A
B
 
Figure 16: Algorithm checks SN flag to distinguish the types of received command 
From figure 16, system checks for SN flag first and if the SN flag is found high then it will 
check the SN to verify replay. The further processing can be found in Figure 14. However, if 
the SN is low then it will check for type of command. If the command received is to reboot or 
resynchronize then it will execute the command as shown in Figure 14 else discard that 
command assuming bogus data. This is how it prevents bogus packets without SN flag to 
compute further.  
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Effects with the removal of Sequence number  
After the removal of SN in reboot and synchronization request, reboot can be performed 
without an idea of previous SN and same as for synchronization. The primary advantage of this 
implementation is in the execution of these two commands. 
 With no SN, computation is faster. 
 No need to synchronize the SN. 
 Probability of rejection of packet due to SN mismatch is decreased.  
However, some serious problems arise with the removal of SN which are listed as follows; 
 With no SN, an attacker can replay with packets and make system continuously 
rebooting. 
 If attacker has an accessed to a key, then he can request the SYN command to receive 
the latest SN from the satellite segment and try new SN to execute command. This may 
leads an attacker to have permanent access on satellite. 
The solution to this problem could be the use of time stamp in every packet. In NUTS project, 
we have not decided to implement time although discussion about the use of absolute and 
relative time was held. Therefore, after the decision is made to use time in satellite, it could be 
studied to use the time stamp instead of sequence number against replay.  
 
4.6 Frame size considering sequence number 
It is clear that our data is encapsulated in CSP frame which is again encapsulated within AX.25 
protocol. In this section we have calculated the maximum size of our final radio packets ready 
to transmit in ideal case. 
 
Modified CSP header: 32-bit 
Sequence Number: 16-bit 
Command: 64-bit (maximum size) 
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CRC: 32-bit 
HMAC code: 256-bit 
Total payload: 32-bit+ 16-bit+64*16(sixteen commands at a time)-bit + 32-bit+256-bit=1360 
bits 
AX.25 header + flag: 128-bit+8-bit=136 bits 
AX.25 information field: 816 bits (maximum information that AX.25 can carry is 2048 bits) 
AX.25 tail (frame check sequence+ flag):  16-bit + 8-bit=24-bit 
Maximum size of NUTS uplink radio frame=136-bit+ 1360-bit+24-bit= 1520 bits 
 
                             Figure 17: NUTS AX.25 radio packet 
 
4.7 Transmitting with Time Stamp 
It is clear that time stamp gives strong solution against relay. Also, time stamp does not need 
synchronization and of sequences between earth and satellite segment. Therefore, the two 
commands proposed earlier for synchronization request-response is not necessary. The only 
thing need to consider is the time drift between received and transmitted time. The time margin 
should be allocated such that the multipath propagated signal can reach the destination within 
bounded time. The packets received after the time limited could be considered as replay. 
Therefore, attacker has no chance to replay the packets. If an attacker attempts to modify the 
time stamp then the HMAC code will be altered which can be detected at the receiving end. 
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 CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSION 
5.1 Discussion and conclusion 
After the analysis of entire system, this part of report is focused in the important outcome of 
each task carried through the research. Firstly, we found the integrity protection of message is 
more significant in CubeSat than its confidentiality. CubeSat is launched with motivation to 
explore the space and fetch the informative educational information. Therefore, visibility of 
uplink command to an outsider does not matter unless an outsider tries to tamper it. Thus, to 
protect the commands from being altered by an attacker was the prime target so we preferred to 
use HMAC code. Nevertheless, integrity protection and encryption gives very strong protection 
but adds the overhead in the transmission. 
 
Secondly, we decided to use HMAC code to protect integrity of uplinked message. An attacker 
trying to tamper the message will result differently HMAC code which can be detected at the 
receiver end. Here, we analyzed three hash functions to test its efficiency in AVR 32-bit 
microcontroller platform which was not performed till now. This analysis was completely a 
new task and the results obtained were very satisfactory. We found that Edon-R was very fast 
with small code size (hex file) than BMW and SHA1. But security strength of BMW is higher 
than Edon and SHA1 according to the various documentation of cryptanalysis. It is up to the 
NUTS authority to decide the choice of hash function for HMAC. In [36]and[37], writer 
presents a fact that even weak hash function can be used in HMAC and can produce a strong 
output due to the secure nature of HMAC. We also found the 20 byte key was efficient to 
produce HMAC code and can provide enough security for NUTS. Regarding the key for 
HMAC, it can be hardcoded in the memory of microcontroller at satellite segment and earth 
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segment. With the use of single permanent key, the problem of key distribution and 
synchronization is avoided but add the risk of key compromise. 
 
Finally, we agreed to use sequence number to provide the freshness in message, it protect 
against replay. NUTS has a life time of 2 years (maximum consideration), so 16-bit SN is far 
enough to send each CSP packet with unique number. These sequence number may loss 
synchronization between transmitter and receiver which may leads to DoS. To prevent this, we 
added a command that synchronizes the SN. This command will make the OBC of satellite 
segment to fetch the latest updated (entered) SN from the memory and transmit to ground 
station. With the idea of this received SN, it is possible to use fresh SN and transmit new radio 
packet. In contrast, these two commands make system vulnerable to a replay attack which may 
results continuously rebooting of a CubeSat. We also presented in brief that time stamp could 
be a good solution against replay attack and to eliminate a resynchronization problem due to 
SN mismatch. In addition, the use of CRC has significant role in error detection and rejection 
of fake or corrupted packet such that the further processing is ended. This also saves the time of 
processor to engage in processing of corrupted packets.  
 
Last but not the least, working with NUTS provides me the opportunity to explore new ideas 
and analyze the real term project closely. It also helps to understand the real environment, co-
operate with the project members from different fields of expertise. Since all of us involved in 
the NUTS project were from different departments. In addition, we believe that this result will 
help NUTS authority to adopt the proper security parameters. 
 
5.2 Further enhancement 
This thesis was a research to analyze the threats and the possible solution to mitigate the threats 
in NUTS. We hope this report fulfills the target assigned for the secure uplink of NUTS. 
However, some enhancement can be done on this work. In future, the security of ground station 
can be analyzed.  
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Integrity and encryption gives strong security but it adds overhead too, in future this can be a 
matter of study. If overhead has less effect in transmission then it is better to make system 
secure. But, significance of these should be determined first in contrast, it is clear that 
launching CubeSat is getting popular this days and in future more and new version of nano-
satellite will be developed and release. May be this will focus and motivates an attacker. 
 
We worked on uploading 16 commands at a time which optimizes the radio resources, still we 
can upload more commands to optimize radio channel. Till this date, all the command set has 
not been finalized for NUTS. As it is cleared that mismatch of sequence number will results in 
denial of service. Therefore, it could be first tested the reliability of commands to synchronize 
SN before launching. 
 
We have proposed that time stamp could be a good and strong solution against replay attack. 
This could be studied further. Nevertheless, first the decision should be made by NUTS 
authority about the implementation of relative or absolute time in CubeSat. 
 
It is found that GENSO network is suitable for CubeSat where ground station is idle for around 
90% of time. IN this scenario concept of joining GENSO sounds interesting. However, access 
control and authentication in the GENSO network can be analyzed. 
 
Finally, the main task remaining will be to develop the software implementing all the proposed 
methodology. We are already lagging in software in compared to hardware. 
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APPENDIX A 
Proposed Telemetry signals for NUTS 
Note: These signals are proposed by NUTS member working in communication protocol. 
Signal classes. (Maybe we could use only 8 bits for this. We’ll have to revise) 
● Backplane voltages: 0x0100 
● Backplane currents: 0x0200 
● Temperatures: 0x0300 
● EPS: 0x0400 
● ADCS: 0x0500 
● Payload: 0x0600 
● OBC: 0x0700 
● Radio: 0x0800 
 
ID Signal Description Size Resolutio
n 
Range Value 
0x0101 MOD1_3V_V 3 V bus 
voltage 
16 0.01 V 0 - 5.12 V meas. value 
* scale = 
phys. value 
0x0201 MOD1_3V_A 3 V bus 
current 
16 2 mA 0 - 1024 
mA 
 
0x0102 MOD2_3V_V 3 V bus 
voltage 
    
0x0202 MOD2_3V_A 3 V bus 
current 
    
0x0103 MOD3_3V_V 3 V bus 
voltage 
    
0x0203 MOD3_3V_A 3 V bus 
current 
    
0x0104 MOD4_3V_V 3 V bus 
voltage 
    
0x0204 MOD4_3V_A 3 V bus     
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current 
0x0105 MOD5_3V_V 3 V bus 
voltage 
    
0x0205 MOD5_3V_A 3 V bus 
current 
    
0x0106 MOD6_3V_V 3 V bus 
voltage 
    
0x0206 MOD6_3V_A 3 V bus 
current 
    
0x0107 MOD7_3V_V 3 V bus 
voltage 
    
0x0207 MOD7_3V_A 3 V bus 
current 
    
0x0108 MOD8_3V_V 3 V bus 
voltage 
    
0x0208 MOD8_3V_A 3 V bus 
current 
    
0x0109 MOD1_5V_V 5 V bus 
voltage 
16 0.02 V 0 - 10.24 V  
0x0209 MOD1_5V_A 5 A bus 
current 
16 2 mA 0 - 1024 
mA 
 
0x010A MOD2_5V_V 5 V bus 
voltage 
    
0x020A MOD2_5V_A 5 A bus 
current 
    
0x010B MOD3_5V_V 5 V bus 
voltage 
    
0x020B MOD3_5V_A 5 A bus 
current 
    
0x010C MOD4_5V_V 5 V bus 
voltage 
    
0x020C MOD4_5V_A 5 A bus 
current 
    
0x010D MOD5_5V_V 5 V bus     
  
71 
 
voltage 
0x020D MOD5_5V_A 5 A bus 
current 
    
0x010E MOD6_5V_V 5 V bus 
voltage 
    
0x020E MOD6_5V_A 5 A bus 
current 
    
0x010F MOD7_5V_V 5 V bus 
voltage 
    
0x020F MOD7_5V_A 5 A bus 
current 
    
0x0110 MOD8_5V_V 5 V bus 
voltage 
    
0x0210 MOD8_5V_A 5 A bus 
current 
    
       
0x0301 BATT_TEMP Battery temp     
0x0302 RADIO_TEM
P 
Radio PCB 
temp 
    
0x0303 ZENIT_TEMP Zenit panel 
temp 
    
0x0304 NADIR_TEM
P 
Nadir panel 
temp 
    
       
0x0401 CELL_A_V Solar cell A 
voltage 
16 0.01 V 0 - 5.12 V  
0x0402 CELL_A_A Solar cell A 
current 
16 1.2 mA 0 - 614.4 
mA 
 
0x0403 CELL_B_V Solar cell B 
voltage 
    
0x0404 CELL_B_A Solar cell B 
current 
    
0x0405 CELL_C_V Solar cell C     
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voltage 
0x0406 CELL_C_A Solar cell C 
current 
    
0x0407 CELL_D_V Solar cell D 
voltage 
    
0x0408 CELL_D_A Solar cell D 
current 
    
0x0409 CELL_E_V Solar cell E 
voltage 
    
0x040A CELL_E_A Solar cell E 
current 
    
       
0x0701 OBC_RTC_E
POC 
Seconds 
since epoc 
   seconds 
since epoc 
       
0x0501 ADCS_MAG_
X 
Magnetomet
er X value 
[nT] 
16 TBD TBD  
0x0501 ADCS_MAG_
Y 
Magnetomet
er Y value 
[nT] 
    
0x0501 ADCS_MAG_
Z 
Magnetomet
er Z value 
[nT] 
    
0x0501 ADCS_SAT_
DIR 
Pointing 
direction 
 TBD TBD TBD 
0x0501 ADCS_MODE Regulated or 
“free” 
    
       
0x0410 MOD1_V_ST
AT 
Status of 
voltage bus 
2   ON/OFF/ER
R 
0x0411 MOD2_V_ST
AT 
     
0x0412 MOD3_V_ST      
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AT 
0x0413 MOD4_V_ST
AT 
     
0x0414 MOD5_V_ST
AT 
     
0x0415 MOD6_V_ST
AT 
     
0x0416 MOD7_V_ST
AT 
     
0x0417 MOD8_V_ST
AT 
     
       
0x0710 MOD1_BUS_
STAT 
Status of I2C 
bus 
2   ON/OFF/ER
R 
0x0712 MOD2_BUS_
STAT 
     
0x0713 MOD3_BUS_
STAT 
     
0x0714 MOD4_BUS_
STAT 
     
0x0715 MOD5_BUS_
STAT 
     
0x0716 MOD6_BUS_
STAT 
     
0x0717 MOD7_BUS_
STAT 
     
0x0718 MOD8_BUS_
STAT 
     
0x0420 EPS_MODE  2   SIMPLE/MP
PT TBD 
0x0421 EPS_5V_A_S
TAT 
 2   ON/OFF/ER
R (Can be 
determined?
??) 
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0x0422 EPS_5V_B_S
TAT 
     
0x0423 EPS_3V_A_S
TAT 
     
0x0424 EPS_3V_B_S
TAT 
     
       
 EPS_      
       
0x0720 OBC_CPU_L
OAD 
CPU-load 8 0.4 % 0 - 100 %  
0x0721 OBC_CPU_F
REQ 
 8 0.4 Hz 0 - 100 Hz Needed???
? 
0x0722 OBC_FLASH
_USE 
% of used 
flash space 
8 0.4%  0 - 100 %  
0x0723 OBC_IMG_V
ER 
Version of 
running 
image 
8   Needed???
? 
       
0x0801 COMM_VHF_
STAT 
Status of 
VHF-radio 
8   May be wise 
to make a 
bit-mask and 
extract data 
from this. 
RX/TX/LOW
_PWR/ERR 
osv.... 
0x0802 COMM_UHF_
STAT 
Status of 
UHF-radio 
8   As above 
0x0803 COMM_B_ST
AT 
Beacon 
status 
8   ON/OFF/CH
ANGED/ORI
GINAL …. 
TBD 
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Command set format 
Command set proposed to NUTS by NUTS member working in communication protocol. 
Request format 
16 48 
Command type Command argument 
 
 
 
Request type Description Parameter Resp
onse 
CAM_TAKE_PIC take picture N/A  
CAM_SET_EXP exposure time exposure time in 
millisecnds 
 
CAM_SET_RES resolution 
  
OBC_TAKE_PIC Schedule 
CAM_TAKE_PIC 
When the 
CAM_TAKE_PIC should 
be issued to the camera, 
in seconds relative to now 
 
GEN_GET_STATUS Get sensor status N/A 
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ADCS_DETUMBLE 
   
ADCS_EARTH_ORIENT 
   
ADCS_ROT_Z 
 
Target radians/sec 
 
ADCS_ROT_Z 
 
Target radians/sec 
 
ADCS_ROT_Y 
 
Target radians/sec 
 
GEN_SYSTEM_RESET 
   
GEN_RESET_SUBSYS 
 
Module number 
 
GEN_PWR_ON_SUBSYS 
 
Module number 
 
GEN_PWR_OFF_SUBSYS 
 
Module number 
 
RADIO_BEACON_ON 
 
N/A 
 
RADIO_BEACON_OFF 
 
N/A 
 
RADIO_BEACON_START 
   
RADIO_BEACON_APPEND 
   
RADIO_BEACON_END 
   
EPS_GET_STATUS 
   
EPS_SET_MODE 
   
 
Response format 
On successful reception and handling of a request, the success bit will be set high. 
1 7 1 7 24 2^24 
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Success bit Command type Last response Options Length Payload 
 
 
Response type Description Parameter Parameters 
RES_GEN_ERROR General error N/A 
 
RES_CAM_TAKE_PIC Response to take a picture 
command 
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